Somebody Has to Give Up the Keys
The SEC staff’s new test for token projects isn’t about decentralization. It’s about who can still change the rules.
Independent contribution. Not sponsored. The author’s views are his own and are not legal, tax or financial advice.
- The shift: “functional,” not “sufficiently decentralized,” is now the test, and the Nov. 2 FAQs define it.
- The test: any unilateral power over access, code or consensus, held by a team, multisig or security council, can sink it.
- Still open: what “distributes rewards” covers, and how emergency powers are treated.
For eight years the question every token project asked its lawyers was whether the network was "sufficiently decentralized." The phrase came from a 2018 speech; the industry treated it as a standard and the Commission treated it as a speech. In March the SEC and CFTC replaced it: a digital commodity is defined by reference to a "functional" crypto system, meaning the chain is live, the token does what the code says, and no central party oversees participation or distributes rewards. On November 2 the Division of Corporation Finance added three FAQs (1.4, 1.5 and 1.6) that confirm "functional" and "decentralized" are distinct concepts, then define functional so that it does most of the work decentralization used to do.
The test that emerges is simpler than the old one and harder to pass by accident: who can still change the rules without asking the token holders?
Who Holds the Keys
FAQ 1.5 asks what it means for a central party to "oversee participation." The staff's answer is unilateral authority to control access at any level (protocol, validator or user), and it names four kinds: granting or limiting access; setting the voting processes for upgrades or distributions; controlling who participates in consensus; and modifying code, reversing transactions or revoking access. There are two ways out. Either every material operation runs automatically through rules-based code with no discretion by anyone, or the discretion that remains is exercised solely through a broad-based governance system whose participants are not themselves a central party.
Run an ordinary launch against that list and it fails in several places: upgradeable proxies behind a team multisig, pause guardians, freeze functions and blocklists, validator sets a foundation curates, a sole sequencer with no forced-inclusion path, a foundation that can reset a quorum or swap the governance contract. Each is a unilateral power over access, code or consensus, and a timelock delays the power without removing it. Groups count too: a seven-member security council is a central party if it can act outside governance.
Voters Are Not a Group, Usually
FAQ 1.4 answers the fear the industry raised in comment letters: that anyone holding a governance token becomes part of a controlling "group." The staff says no, generally. Participants in a broad-based governance system are not a group if they are unaffiliated and have no separate agreement to act in concert, and even a group needs operational, economic or voting control to qualify. The footnotes narrow the comfort. "Broad-based" means a system that permits and results in participation by a wide and diverse set of stakeholders and does not concentrate authority, including through delegation, in one stakeholder or a coordinated group. A foundation that holds a quarter of the supply and delegates it to four paid delegates has built a bloc that may be acting in concert. And a foundation that houses a functional chain's governance can still be the central party of the applications it controls on that chain.
Footnote 3 is the wall. The staff's view applies only to the digital commodity analysis in Section III of the March release. It says nothing about whether a protocol is an "exchange" under the Exchange Act, nothing about whether token holders are partners under state law (Samuels v. Lido DAO let that claim proceed in 2024 against three investors active in the DAO's governance), and nothing about tax, where a group that carries on a venture and divides its profits can be a partnership under § 7701(a)(2) and its regulations whatever the SEC thinks. Flip a fee switch and you may owe K-1s.
Same Words, Different Jobs
FAQ 1.6 and the release's footnotes leave a ladder with three rungs. A system is functional when its native token can be used for the system's programmatic purpose and no central party oversees participation or distributes rewards. A functional system with no central party at all is what FAQs 2.4 and 2.5 require before issuer statements and buyback announcements stop counting as promises of managerial effort. A decentralized system adds only that it "functions and operates autonomously"; the no-control requirement is already the middle rung's. The staff's phrase is that a functional system "has characteristics of decentralization," with the degree varying by facts. The middle rung is where the work happens.
The day after the FAQs, the staff showed what the middle rung looks like. In a November 3 no-action letter the Division said it views Canton Coin as a digital commodity and would not recommend enforcement over the coin being minted programmatically by validators and application providers without Securities Act or Exchange Act registration, relying on Digital Asset's representations that the token's value derives from the network's programmatic operation and that the network has no central party. The letter says it expresses no legal conclusion and that different facts could change the result. It is still the staff's first application of the test to a named network.
What the Staff Left Open
Two gaps. The release defines a functional system as one with no central party that oversees participation "or distributes rewards"; the FAQs define the first clause and leave the second alone. Gas fees and newly minted units are clearly native rewards; points programs, retroactive airdrops and a foundation's quarterly incentives budget are closer to the line. And nothing addresses emergency powers. The fourth category in 1.5 describes what a security council does, and the governance exit requires discretion exercised "solely" through governance, which a council acting alone is not. The only text on point is the Senate's CLARITY bill, which would have said that a security council's pre-defined, temporary cybersecurity emergency measures, authorized on-chain under published rules, do not alone amount to control. That bill failed cloture on September 15. Until the staff speaks, the bill's conditions are the closest thing to a design spec.
What to Do Now
Inventory every power a person or multisig can exercise without a token-holder vote. Decide what happens to each: into code, into on-chain governance, or retired. Scope the emergency powers you keep to the narrowest version you can defend. Diligence the governance itself: affiliations, side letters, voting covenants, delegate programs, turnout and concentration. Keep FAQ 1.4 in its lane; it is not an exchange, partnership or tax analysis. And re-date the switch: the system became functional on the later of the go-live date and the date the last unilateral power over participation went away.
Then hold it loosely. The FAQs say in their own header that they have no legal force or effect, and the staff revised 2.5 one business day after posting it in September. Keep dated copies. The staff deserves credit for replacing an undefined standard with a list a developer can check code against. The price of a list that clear is that somebody has to give up the keys.
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